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OVER A DECADE  has  passed  since  the standard  remedy  of demand  restraint 
was first  urged  to combat  inflation.  By the mid-1960s,  many  economists, 
including  those at the Council  of Economic Advisers,  believed war ex- 
penditures  were  pushing  the economy  into  the inflationary,  excess-demand 
zone and recommended  tax increases  to help restrain  aggregate  demand. 
We cannot  know  how different  subsequent  economic  performance  would 
have  been if that advice  had been heeded.  But it was not. Unemployment 
continued  to decline  into 1969, and the inflation  rate in consumer  prices 
rose above  5 percent.  Inflation,  by then,  had become  firmly  entrenched  in 
economic  decisionmaking.  When  demand  finally  fell and unemployment 
rose in the recession of 1970, the inflation  rate scarcely  budged. Both 
average  hourly  earnings  and  the private  nonfarm  price  deflator  rose faster 
during  1970-71 than  in any  year  of the 1960s. 
Many observers  concluded  that a recession  deeper than that of 1970 
would  be needed  to stop  inflation.  In summer  1971, the Nixon administra- 
tion tried a different  cure, imposing  wage and price controls  that lasted 
in modified  form until April 1974. These controls slowed the inflation 
rate for most wages and prices. But by the time the controls expired, 
higher  prices  for food and fuel, which  were  largely  unrelated  to the state 
of demand,  and  for industrial  raw  materials,  which  reflected  strong  world 
demand  and speculative  buying,  had created  double-digit  rates  of overall 
Note: I am grateful  to Jesse  M. Abraham  for his extensive research  assistance. 
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Table  1. Wage  and  Price Inflation  in the United  States, Selected  Periods,  1954-78 
Average  annual  percent  change 
Private  nonfarm  economy 
Hourly 
Compensation earnings  Price  Consumer 
Period  per hour  index  deflator  price index 
Post-Korean  War  (1954-59)  4.6  4.1  2.4  1.4 
Early 1960s  (1960-65)  4.0  3.1  1.1  1.3 
Late 1960s  (1966-69)  6.4  5.6  3.7  3.8 
Precontrol  1970s  (1970-71)  6.7  6.8  4.7  5.1 
Controls  (1972-73)  6.8  6.5  3.6  4.8 
Food-fuel explosion (1974-75)  9.5  8.5  10.7  10.1 
1976  >  8.7  7.2  5.2  5.8 
1977  8.8  7.3  5.4  6.5 
1978:1&  9.lb  8.Ob  6.3  6.6 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Percent change from the first quarter of  1977 to first quarter of  1978. 
b. Without the large increase in the minimum wage in January 1978, the increases would have been an 
estimated 8.9 percent for compensation and 7.6 percent for hourly earnings. 
inflation.  Together  with a nonacconunodating  aggregate-demand  policy, 
this price explosion  also started  a recession  that was double the size of 
the average  previous  postwar  recession  and that lasted  until spring  1975. 
It is now three  years  since  the trough  of this deepest  postwar  recession. 
By the end of that recession,  inflation  had slowed sharply  from its 1974 
pace, but further  improvement  was slight once recovery  began. From 
1975 through 1977, all available  measures  of tightness  in either labor 
markets  or product  markets  registered  ample  slack.  And no large  upward 
movements  have occurred  in particular  components  of the price level 
since the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  increased  oil 
prices in 1974. Yet despite all these disinflationary  developments,  the 
rate of inflation,  by any broad measure,  has continued  at a historically 
high  rate and  now shows  signs  of creeping  still further  upward. 
Table 1 summarizes  the inflation  in the economy  since  the Korean  War 
as measured  by four alternative  indexes: compensation  per hour, the 
hourly  earnings  index, and the price deflator,  all of which are averages 
for the private  nonfarm  economy;  and the consumer  price  index. Except 
in 1974 and 1975, when controls  ended and oil prices soared,  the three 
measures  for the private  nonfarm  economy  have moved closely together, 
with compensation  per hour and the price deflator  differing  by approxi- 
mately  the trend  rate  of growth  in labor  productivity.  The consumer  price 
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when  the relative  prices  of food or imports  changed  a great  deal, although 
the inclusion  of these  prices  is not the only  difference  between  the indexes. 
By any of these measures,  inflation has been noticeably faster in the 
1970s than  in previous  periods.  It has been faster  since 1975 than  in the 
early 1970s. And it has been faster over the most recent four quarters 
than  in previous  years  of the  present  recovery. 
Inflation  is unpopular.  It hampers  policymaking  and inhibits  the pur- 
suit  of high  employment.  This paper  provides  a basis  for evaluating  alter- 
native  approaches  to slowing  it. 
The  Mainline  Model 
In this  section  I briefly  outline  what  I perceive  to be the important  char- 
acteristics  of the U.S. economy that have led to the present stubborn 
inflation.  Unlike many  journalists  describing  the stagflation  period,  I do 
not conclude  that economists  fail to understand  the economy.  And un- 
like some professional  writers  of this period,  I do not conclude  that the 
Keynesian  revolution  got everything  wrong.  However, we have learned 
during  the past ten years  that the Keynesian  analysis  stops short of ade- 
quately  modeling  the inflation  process. 
Let me begin by describing  the essential  features  of what I call the 
mainline  model of the U.S. macroeconomy.  It offers a description  of 
macroeconomic  behavior  that is compatible  with a broad  range  of more 
specific models that would have similar policy implications.  I  later 
discuss some alternative  views of the economy and of the current  stag- 
flation that are not consistent  with this mainline model and that have 
policy implications  that I believe  are basically  misleading. 
In the mainline  model,  wage  and  price  behavior  are  closely  linked,  and 
there  is at least some mutual  causality  between  them. Because  the effect 
of wages  on prices  is more  predictable  and better  established,  it is useful 
to begin  analyzing  the inflation  problem  by describing  the macroeconom- 
ics of labor  markets. 
Wages respond  to the tightness  of labor markets  but not enough to 
avoid  fluctuations  in employment  brought  about  by corresponding  fluctu- 
ations  in demand.  Thus,  something  like a Phillips  curve  exists,  at least for 
periods  that  are  relevant  to policymakers  and  to the conduct  of economic 
affairs,  and for the range  of unemployment  actually  experienced.  Within 
this framework,  average  wages  begin to rise at an inflationary  rate while 
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Wages  also  respond  to what  has  been  happening  to wages,  prices,  profit 
margins,  or all three,  or to what  is expected  to happen  to them.  All these 
alternatives  are accommodated  in the mainline  model and are discussed 
further  below. What  is important  is that they all predict  considerable  in- 
ertia  in wage  inflation.  The response  of wages  to variations  in demand  is 
characteristically  sluggish. 
Some prices are sensitive  to demand,  particularly  prices of industrial 
raw materials  and goods whose costs include  a large  component  of costs 
for raw materials.  Agricultural  prices are sensitive  to world crop condi- 
tions, and prices of tradable  goods respond  to competition  from goods 
produced  abroad.  But prices  in most of the private  sector are closely re- 
lated  to variable  costs, the most  important  of which  are  labor  costs. Given 
wages, these prices are only slightly affected by demand, and conse- 
quently  their  movement  in response  to demand  variations  is also sluggish. 
With the possible exception  of situations  in which unemployment  is 
exceptionally  low or industrial  operating  rates are exceptionally  high, 
variations  in aggregate  demand  lead  primarily  to variations  in output,  em- 
ployment, and unemployment.  There can be sustained  unemployment 
arising  from inadequate  demand.  At the aggregate  level, the response  to 
variations  in demand  is similar  whether  the variation  comes from fiscal 
policy, monetary  policy, an unexplained  change  in velocity,  or from  some 
shift in demand  from the private  sector or from foreign  demand  for ex- 
ports. 
Within  this general  description,  a number  of issues that are important 
to the design  of anti-inflation  policy remain  open. What is the response 
of inflation  to alternative  paths of real activity?  Are wages affected  by 
past wages, past living costs, past price margins  or profitability,  or all 
three?  Is the inertia  of inflation  essentially  backward  looking or forward 
looking; and to the extent that expectations  matter, how can they be 
affected?  These  are  difficult  questions  that  are  not easily  settled  by empiri- 
cal evidence.  But  that  is a place  to begin. 
The  Empirical  Mainline  Model 
The empirical  counterpart  to the model of the inflation  process  that I 
have sketched  has been presented  before  with  many  variations.  Although 
the level of aggregation  may  differ,  the essentials  are an equation  relating 
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possibly  to some additional  effects  from demand  and the prices of com- 
peting imports;  and an equation  relating  wages to the tightness  of the 
labor  market  and  to past  or expected  future  inflation. 
I do not  present  any  new  results  on the  price  equations.  Robert  Gordon 
has recently  reviewed  the aggregate  evidence  and reaffirmed  that prices 
change  in proportion  to wage changes."  Other  factors  also have an effect, 
including  the costs of raw materials,  competing  imports,  and to a small 
extent,  variations  in demand.  However,  including  them in the explana- 
tion  does  not diminish  the  importance  of labor  costs. 
The principal  unsettled  issues are concerned  with the causes  of inertia 
in wage inflation.  I turn first to some disaggregated  evidence  from the 
1960s  and 1970s. 
DISAGGREGATED  WAGE  CHANGES 
The first  evidence  of the stubbornness  of inflation  came  when average 
wages  and prices  failed to decelerate  much despite  rising  unemployment 
after  1969. The behavior  of wages  in particular  sectors  is noteworthy  dur- 
ing this period. Some wages are set under collective bargaining  agree- 
ments,  frequently  with three-year  contracts.  Many factors  can enter  into 
union  wage  demands  in such bargaining  situations,  including  wage levels 
elsewhere  and living costs. There is no well-established  model of what 
unions can successfully  bargain  for and, especially  when contracts  are 
negotiated  infrequently  and  prices  and  other  wages  have changed  between 
contracts,  new settlements  can bear little relation  to current  unemploy- 
ment rates. While wages set under collective bargaining  may represent 
an especially  obvious  departure  from short-run  market  clearing  in wage 
setting,  virtually  no wages are set in auction  markets.  Long-term  attach- 
ments  between  firms  and  workers  are  useful  to both sides and  characterize 
a large  portion  of the job market.  In such situations,  equity,  which may 
embrace  relative  wages or inflation,  becomes  an important  consideration 
in wage  setting.  Both unionization  and long-term  attachments  character- 
ize some  industries  more  than  others.  As a consequence,  wages  in different 
industries  do not move in parallel  under changing  economic  conditions. 
High- and Low-Wage  Industries.  A random  sample of 39 industries 
at the three-digit  level of aggregation  was divided  into groups  with high, 
medium,  and  low wages  according  to the average  of their  hourly  earnings 
1. Robert J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation of the 1970s be Explained?"  BPEA, 1: 
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over the 1959-76 period.  For each group,  the following  table shows the 
average  wage increases  during  the 1960s and 1970s and the difference 
between  the  averages  for  the  two  periods. 
Average  annual  percent 
increase  in hourly  earnings 
Industry 
classification  1959-69  1970-76  Acceleration 
Low  wage  3.8  6.5  2.8 
Medium  wage  3.7  6.9  3.3 
High  wage  3.5  7.8  4.3 
After rising  slightly  more slowly than wages  in the low-wage  group  dur- 
ing the 1960s, wages in the high-wage  group  accelerated  4.3 percentage 
points  in the 1970s, compared  with an acceleration  of 2.8 points  for the 
low-wage  group.  The consumer  price  index  accelerated  by 4.0 points  over 
the same interval.  The acceleration  of wages  in the high-wage  industries 
kept  pace  over  the 1970-76 interval  with  the acceleration  in the consumer 
price  index. 
The coefficient  of variation  of wage levels among  the industries  sam- 
pled declined  gradually  from 0.20 in 1959 to 0.18 in 1968.2  It then rose 
gradually  to 0.21 in 1974 and then to 0.23 in 1975 and 0.24 in 1976. 
Over  the period  from 1959 to 1976, an equation  of the form developed 
by Wachter  to explain  the coefficient  of variation  (CV) among  industry 
wages  produced  the  following  estimates:  3 
(1)  CV =  0.20-  0. 10 u*-'  +  0.26 A  ln  CP, 
(12.0) (-3.2)  (2.7) 
Durbin-Watson =  1.1; standard error =  0.11, 
where  u*-' is the inverse  of the weighted  unemployment  rate and CP is 
the consumer  price  index.  The numbers  in parentheses  in all equations  are 
t statistics. 
Wachter  reasoned  that  wage  dispersion  was cyclical.  He found  that  the 
variation  was reduced  by inflation,  which  was closely correlated  with un- 
employment  in his sample  period.  Equation  1 supports  Wachter's  cyclical 
conclusion  that lower  unemployment  reduces  wage dispersion;  but it im- 
2.  Only 38 of the 39 industries  were included in the coefficient of variation be- 
cause  wage data for industry  421-3 were available  only for 1964-76. 
3.  Michael L. Wachter, "The Wage Process: An Analysis of the Early 1970s," 
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plies that inflation  independently  increases  it. Stagflation  increases  it on 
both  counts. 
Equations  for annual  wage increases  in individual  industries  also re- 
veal the relatively  stronger  effect of inflation  and the weaker effect of 
unemployment  in the high-wage  industries.  Tables  2a and  2b show  simple 
Phillips  curves  for each of the 26 industries  in the low-wage and high- 
wage groups.  In each case, the change  in hourly earnings  adjusted  for 
overtime  was regressed  on the average  increase  in the CPI over the two 
previous  years  and on the inverse  of weighted  unemployment.4  A dummy 
variable  equal to 1 in 1974 and 1975 was included  in each equation  to 
avoid  giving  undue  weight  to the observations  for those two years.  Using 
annual  data, wages  in both years  were strongly  affected  by the combina- 
tion of food and fuel inflation  and the end of controls.  This situation  is 
examined  more carefully  below using aggregate  wage equations. 
Although the individual  industry  equations  are often unsatisfactory, 
the average  coefficient  in each group  fits the expected  pattern.  The aver- 
age coefficient  on unemployment  is  11.5 for the low-wage industries 
and 6.8 for the high-wage  industries;  the average  coefficients  on the CPI 
are 0.6 and 0.8, respectively.  Similar  results  are also obtained  when the 
CPI is replaced  by average  hourly earnings  as the lagged inflation  vari- 
able. The change in the minimum  wage makes no contribution  as an 
additional  explanatory  variable,  even in the low-wage industries.  I as- 
sume this negative  result  reflects  the poor quality  of equations  for indi- 
vidual industries.  In Gramlich's  careful analysis of minimum  wages, a 
1 percent  change  in the minimum  adds 0.03 percent  to average  wages.5 
The impact  on wages  in low-wage  industries  should  be many  times  larger 
than  this  estimate  for the aggregate. 
Union  Wages. For the past two years,  data  from  the employment  cost 
index have been available  for wage and salary  increases  in occupations 
both covered  and not covered  by collective  bargaining  agreements.  Cov- 
ered wages  rose 8.1 and 7.6 percent  during  1976 and 1977, respectively 
(fourth  quarter  to fourth  quarter).  These increases  are 1.3 and 1.0 per- 
centage  points  more  than  the rise in uncovered  wages  in the two years. 
For years before 1976, effective union wage changes can be compared 
4.  The overtime adjustment  could not be made for nonmanufacturing  industries. 
Those equations  refer to hourly earnings. 
5. Edward M. Gramlich, "Impact  of Minimum  Wages on Other Wages, Employ- 
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TabIe  2a. Disaggregated  Wage Change  Equations:  Low-Wage  Industies 
Percent 
Standard  Independent  variable 
industrial  Durbin- 
classification  Lagged  1974-75  Standard  Watsoni 
code  Unemployment  CPI  dummy  error  statistic 
23  12.60  0.46  1.79  1.74  1.7 
(2.4)  (2.4)  (1.2) 
22  13.40  0.54  1.87  1.13  1.6 
(3.9)  (4.3)  (2.0) 
203  8.90  0.73  3.51  1.05  1.4 
(2.8)  (6.2)  (4.0) 
25  16.02  0.53  2.39  0.76  1.8 
(7.0)  (6.3)  (3.8) 
39  14.31  0.53  2.51  0.70  2.4 
(6.7)  (6.8)  (4.3) 
367  10.18  0.41  4.67  1.25  2.4 
(2.7)  (3.0)  (4.5) 
365  13.12  0.64  3.86  1.47  0.9 
(2.9)  (3.9)  (3.1) 
209  7.00  0.67  1.21  0.92  1.3 
(2.5)  (6.6)  (1.6) 
243  14.35  0.88  1.85  0.70  2.7 
(6.8)  (11.4)  (3.2) 
FIREb  7.82  0.38  1.81  0.75  2.2 
(3.5)  (4.6)  (2.9) 
364  7.77  0.61  2.58  1.01  1.4 
(2.5)  (5.5)  (3.1) 
52-59  10.77  0.39  1.87  0.63  2.6 
(5.6)  (5.5)  (3.5) 
375-9  13.83  0.54  1.48  1.72  2.5 
(2.7)  (2.8)  (1.0) 
Mean  11.5  0.56  2.4  ... 
See sources and footnotes for table 2b. 
with changes  in the average  hourly earnings  index, which includes  both 
union  and  nonunion  workers.  During  most of the 1960s, effective  median 
union wage increases lagged slightly behind the increases in average 
hourly  earnings.  Beginning  in 1968, data on mean  increases  are available 
that show union increases  equaling  average  increases  outside the union 
sector  in 1968-69 and  then  outpacing  them  in subsequent  years. 
Table 3 compares  the percentage  increase in union wages with the 
increases  in the index of average  hourly earnings  for 1970-77. Union George L. Perry  267 
Table  2b. Disaggregated  Wage Change  Equations:  High-Wage  Industries 
Percent 
Standard  Independent  variable 
industrial  Durbin- 
classification  Lagged  1974-75  Standard  Watson 
code  Unemployment  CPI  dummy  error  statistic 
366  6.39  0.71  2.28  1.00  2.2 
(2.1)  (6.3)  (2.7) 
357  6.49  0.47  2.70  1.20  1.7 
(1.8)  (3.5)  (2.7) 
481  1.18  1.25  2.58  1.7 
(4.2)  (0.6) 
356  6.96  0.68  2.45  0.75  1.6 
(3.1)  (8.2)  (3.9) 
335  5.41  0.81  2.34  1.23  1.2 
(1.5)  (6.0)  (2.3) 
352  2.79  0.57  4.80  1.27  2.3 
(0.7)  (4.0)  (4.5) 
353  5.76  0.77  3.41  0.93  1.2 
(2.0)  (7.4)  (4.4) 
354  11.94  0.66  1.88  0.58  2.0 
(6.8)  (10.3)  (3.9) 
331  2.72  1.01  5.31  2.21  1.7 
(0.4)  (4.1)  (2.9) 
12  11.54  1.17  3.16  2.36  1.8 
(1.6)  (4.4)  (1.6) 
421-3  0.56  -0.86  3.03  0.8 
(1.4)  (-0.3) 
332  7.72  1.12  -0.25  1.04  2.5 
(2.5)  (9.7)  (-0.3) 
371  7.31  0.64  3.37  1.65  2.2 
(1.5)  (3.5)  (2.4) 
Mean  6.8  0.80  2.5 
Sources: Data from U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, with wages in manufacturing industries adjusted 
for overtime by the author. See text for definitions of the variables. 
a.  AU equations are estimated for the period 1959-76, with a constant term that is not reported. The 
dependent  variable is the percent change in overtime-adjusted  hlourly  earnings. The numbers in parentheses 
are t statistics. The regression for industry 421-3 is for the period 1964-76. 
b. FIRE is the fire insurance and real estate industries. 
c.  The unemployment coefficient was negative, so the equation was reestimated  without it. 
wages rose much faster in 1970 and 1971 when union increases  were 
unaffected  by the recession  and when unions negotiated  to catch up for 
their small real gains during  the late 1960s. During the control years, 
union wages moved in step with the average. And both accelerated 
sharply  in the two subsequent  years  of price  explosion.  For the eiglht  years 268  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1978 
Table  3. Union  and Total Private  Wage  Increases,  1970-77 
Percent  per year 
Effective  union  Increase  in index  Real union 
Year!  wage-rate  of average  hourly  wage-rate 
Period  change&  earnings  Difference  changeb 
1970  8.8  6.6  2.2  2.9 
1971  9.2  7.0  2.2  4.9 
1972  6.6  6.6  0.0  3.3 
1973  7.0  6.4  0.6  0.8 
1974  9.4  8.2  1.2  -1.6 
1975  8.7  8.8  -0.  1  -0.4 
1976  8.1  7.2  0.9  2.3 
1977  8.0  7.3  0.7  1.5 
1970-77 
average  8.2  7.3  0.9  1.7 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Average effective union wage-rate changes in agreements covering 1,000 or more workers. 
b. Effective union wage increases less the increase in the CPI. 
as a whole (1970-77),  union  wages  have risen  an average  of 1 percent  a 
year  faster.  But while  they  have outpaced  average  wages  over this  period, 
the 1.7 percent  average  annual  increase  in real wages  in the union sector 
during  the 1970s just  maintained  the average  rate  of real  wage  increase  of 
the previous  decade. 
Looking Forward or Backward? The data on union wage increases 
during  the inflationary  period  of the past decade  can help distinguish  be- 
tween  forward-looking  and backward-looking  views of the inflation  pro- 
cess. Purely expectational  models can have different  implications  from 
those that  relate  current  wage and price developments  to actual  develop- 
ments  of the past.  If the inertia  in inflation  arose  from  a purely  backward- 
looking process, current wage setting would be  influenced  by wage 
changes  that have already  occurred  elsewhere  or by price changes  that 
have occurred  since wages currently  being set were last changed. The 
prospect  that  inflation  would accelerate  or decelerate  in the future  would 
not enter  because  wage changes  would be simply  catching  up with past 
events.  If the process  were purely  forward  looking, only expectations  of 
future  inflation  would matter.  Bygones  are presumably  bygones  and past 
changes  in wages or prices enter  only as people form expectations  from 
them.  Unfortunately,  analysis  with  statistical  time  series  is unsuccessful  in 
distinguishing  between  forward-looking  and backward-looking  processes 
when "expectations"  are not directly observable  and are modeled as George L. Perry  269 
Table 4. Real and  Relative  Wage Gains  in Major Union Contracts,  1968-75 
Percentage  points over three years 
Relative  wage  gain"  Real wage  gain" 
Average  Forward  Backward  Forward  Backward 
Contract  wage  gain  lookingb  lookingb  lookingb  lookingb 
year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1968  19.5  0.1  3.9  4.0  9.5 
1969  23.4  3.2  5.7  7.8  10.9 
1970  25.9  5.7  6.5  12.4  10.4 
1971  26.1  6.1  5.9  12.3  10.5 
1972  24.9  3.7  4.7  4.4  11.4 
1973  23.5  0.1  3.5  -2.8  9.7 
1974  25.2  1.0  4.0  -0.7  4.7 
1975  25.7  2.4  2.3  4.3  -0.6 
Standard  deviation  2.3  1.4  5.1  4.2 
Sources: Union  wage changes are calculated as described in notes to this table using data from U.S. 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics on effective wage rate changes. Adjusted average hourly earnings and con- 
sumer price indexes are fromli  BLS. 
a. Relative wage gain is union wage change (defined in the next note) relative to the change in the average 
hourly earnings index. Real wage gain is union wage change relative to the change in the consumer price 
index. 
b. The union wage change each year is the increase from current settlements plus average gains in the 
next two years from prior settlements and escalator provisions. Forward-looking gain is this change less 
the increase over the same time interval in average hourly earnings or the consumer price index. Backward- 
looking gain is this change less the increase  in average hourly earnings from three years earlier or the CPI. 
lagged  values of past inflation.  In order  to distinguish  between  the two, 
it is necessary  to turn  to other  types  of evidence. 
Various institutional  or political arrangements  whose purpose is to 
neutralize,  at least partly,  the effects  of inflation  on wages  are  based on a 
backward-looking  approach.  Adjustments  in labor contracts  to account 
for increases  in the cost of living  modify  wages according  to past changes 
in the CPI. Such arrangements  make it possible to avoid forecasts of 
future  inflation.  The minimum  wage law has typically  been adjusted  to 
take account  of past changes  in average  wages. And the comparability 
rule  for government  wages  relates  them  to past changes  in wages  of work- 
ers  in the  private  sector  in similar  occupations. 
Major union wage contracts  are the clearest  instance of wage com- 
mitments  made well into the future. If the forward-looking  hypothesis 
works  anywhere,  it should  work  in explaining  these settlements.  Table 4 
analyzes  wage gains in major  union contracts  for the period 1968-75. 
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the life of the contract,  including  gains from escalator  provisions.6  Col- 
umns  2 to 5 compare  these settlement  increases  with  both past and  future 
changes  in the CPI  and  in adjusted  average  hourly  earnings  for the  private 
nonfarm  economy.  The hypothesis  that settlements  are forward  looking 
is expressed  in columns  2 and 4, where  the percentage  increases  in aver- 
age earnings  throughout  the economy  and  in the CPI over the three-year 
duration  of union settlements  are subtracted  from the increases  under 
the settlements.  Columns  3 and 5 express  the hypothesis  that settlements 
are backward  looking. There the increase in average earnings  for the 
economy  as a whole and in the CPI over the three years ending  in the 
year  of the settlement  are subtracted  from the increases  under  the settle- 
ments.  Data are available  for these  calculations  only for the years  shown. 
Because  these  major  settlements  are concentrated  in situations  that  are 
comparatively  insensitive  to unemployment  rates and presumably  sensi- 
tive to living costs and relative  wages, the hypothesis  that yields the less 
erratic  series  for wage gains should  be preferred.  In this case, the back- 
ward-looking  hypothesis  is a more satisfactory  one, even though the 
forward-looking  hypothesis  is given an advantage  in the contest  through 
comparing  CPI gains  with settlement  gains  that include  escalator  adjust- 
ments  for the same  years. 
AGGREGATE  WAGE  EQUATIONS 
I turn  now to some aggregate  wage equations  to observe  how well the 
Phillips  curve  and  alternative  specifications  of lagged  inflation  effects  pre- 
dicted  wages  during  the 1970s. Table 5 presents  Phillips  curve  equations 
for the annual  change  in adjusted  hourly  earnings  in the private  nonfarm 
sector (100 x A ln E), using  three  alternative  lagged  inflation  variables: 
the dependent  variable,  the CPI (100 x A ln CP), and  the private  nonfarm 
deflator  after the effects  of the rise in fuel prices in 1974-75 have been 
removed  (100  x  A ln DP). Two years of lagged  inflation  are shown in 
each case, although  the second year is frequently  insignificant.  A third- 
year lag invariably  was insignificant  and small or wrong-signed.  Esti- 
6. The average gain from settlements made in year t is estimated by adding the 
average  deferred  increases in years t +  1 and t +  2 to the average first-year  increase 
in t. The deferred increases in each year are averaged over the number of workers 
who did not receive first-year  increases  in that year. This procedure  is not precise and 
can only approximate  the actual increases  that occur over the life of contracts  newly 
negotiated  in any given year. W  QI  00  0 
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mates  are  shown  for periods  beginning  in 1954 and ending  in 1969, 1971, 
aind  1977. 
The quarterly  pattern of wage and price changes during 1973-74 
clearly  points to a discontinuity  with the end of controls  in the second 
quarter  of 1974. It is difficult  to model  this  situation.  Controls  were  ended 
when the CPI was already  soaring  as a consequence  of increases  in un- 
controlled  prices of food and fuel and, to a lesser extent, raw materials 
and imports. Without these price shocks, wages might have behaved 
differently  when controls  ended. Nonetheless,  in the equation  estimated 
through  1977, I allowed for an amount  of wage catch-up  in 1974-75 
equal to the amount wages were held down in  1972-73  by adding a 
dummy  variable  (DNIX) equal  to -1  in 1972 and 1973 and +  1 in 1974 
and 1975. If one believes that little or no postcontrol "make-up"  in 
wages would have occurred  if it had not been for the rapid inflation 
caused by food and fuel prices, this procedure  underestimates  the re- 
sponse of wages to that price explosion by attributing  a part of actual 
wage changes  in 1974 and 1975 to a reversal  of the wage moderation 
accomplished  by controls. 
Labor Market Effects.  The labor  market  variable  is the weighted  un- 
employment  rate, holding constant the 1966 demographic  proportions 
of the labor  force. The weighting  produces  a wage-bill  concept  of unem- 
ployed labor resources;  maintaining  fixed labor force proportions  pro- 
vides a measure  that  will not show a change  in the tightness  of the labor 
market  if the unemployment  rate  of each group  is constant  while its rela- 
tive proportions  vary. This measure  of weighted  unemployment  will not 
capture  the possibility  that some groups  are on flatter  or steeper  portions 
of their "own"  Phillips  curves  than other  groups.  However,  it is difficult 
to model  that  possibility  from  available  data. 
A striking  feature  of table 5 is that the estimated  short-run  effect of 
changing  labor market  tightness  on wages is nearly  the same for any of 
the three periods and for any of the three measures  of lagged inflation. 
They  all indicate  only a modest  first-year  effect  on inflation  from  a change 
in unemployment.  For instance,  using equation 5.1, an unemployment 
rate 1 percentage  point lower than present  levels would add about 0.43 
percentage  point  to the rate of wage  inflation,  while an increase  of 1 per- 
centage  point of unemployment  would subtract  about 0.28 point. Using 
equation  5.7, the estimates  are 0.37 point and -0.25  point, respectively. 
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gradually.  In the third year, equation  5.1 predicts  that wages would be 
rising  0.5 percentage  point slower  if unemployment  were sustained  at a 
level 1 point higher,  and 0.8 point faster  with unemployment  sustained 
1 point  lower.  The corresponding  third-year  estimates  from  equation  5.7 
are  0.7 point  slower  and 1.0 point  faster. 
Another  way to compare  the estimates  for different  periods  is to ob- 
serve their characterizations  of high employment.  Equation 5.7, whose 
lagged  wage effects  sum to 1.0, implies  that 4.0 percent  weighted  unem- 
ployment-corresponding  today to about 5.5 percent  conventional  un- 
employment-is consistent  with a steady  long-run  inflation  rate. At this 
weighted  unemployment  rate, equations  5.1 and 5.4 predict  an eventual 
steady  rate of wage increase  of 3.5 percent  and 3.4 percent.  Such wage 
increases  would yield about a 1.5 percent  rate of price inflation,  which 
is about  as close as the economy  ever comes  to price  stability. 
Lagged Effects.  Lagged  values  of the unemployment  measure  did not 
enter  the wage equation  significantly  for any period  of estimation.  What- 
ever effect  there  is on average  wages  from  the state of labor markets  ap- 
parently  occurs promptly.  However, the influence  of lagged inflation  is 
strong  and  the estimated  size of this  influence  is substantially  greater  when 
the 1970s are  included  in the estimation  period. 
The straightforward  interpretation  of this drift  in the estimated  size of 
lagged  inflation  effects  is that  the significance  of ongoing  inflation  has  risen 
together  with the rising  rate of inflation.  According  to this interpretation, 
so long as rapid  inflation  was not sustained  for an extended  period,  it was 
less important  in setting  wages. Alternatively,  it may be that the impor- 
tance  of lagged  effects  are  misestimated  in the equations  for some  periods, 
and there exists a "true"  set of lagged inflation  coefficients  that is un- 
changed. 
Whether  the lagged  effects  actually  sum  to 1.0 or to a little  less than 1.0 
is not important  for understanding  the current  inflation  predicament. 
There  will be considerable  inertia  to inflation  with  any  large  value  of these 
lagged  effects.  When  the lagged  effects  sum  to 1.0, the model  has only one 
unemployment  rate at which inflation  is predicted  to remain  unchanged 
in the long run. For relevant  time horizons, the predictions  from that 
model are little different  from  the predictions  of a model that has a long- 
run  trade-off  with coefficients  on recent  inflation  summing  to 0.8 or so. 
The errors  for the 1970s from the equations  of table 5 are shown in 
table 6. Even the equations  estimated  through  1977 show persistent  un- t-  tn  tn  (2%  cs  ^ 
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derpredictions  through 1975; and in the equations estimated  through 
1969, with their smaller  lagged effects, the underpredictions  are large. 
The catching  up of union wages in 1970-71 and the price explosion  of 
1974-75 are  two events  of the period  that  would  not be predictable  from 
aggregate  wage  equations,  and  that  may  help explain  the underpredictions 
of this  period. 
Lagged  CPI. There  is no clear  preferable  alternative  among  the mea- 
sures  of lagged inflation,  although  based on the standard  errors  for all 
three sample  periods, the CPI is unsatisfactory  as a single explanatory 
variable  for inertia.  The Durbin-Watson  statistics  for the CPI equations 
are also consistently  low, and when the equations  are reestimated  with a 
rho correction,  the sum of the lagged  CPI coefficients  falls to 0.2 in the 
1977 regressions.  Thus, the estimates  give no support  to the hypothesis 
that wages vary in order to attain some real wage level. However, the 
evidence  in favor  of some CPI effects  on wages  is considerably  stronger. 
During  the 1976-77 period  when inflation  slowed substantially,  the CPI 
equations  clearly  outperformed  the equations  using  the nonfarm  deflator. 
And residuals  from any of the equations  show that the food-fuel price 
explosion  did  affect  wage  behavior  in 1974-75. 
Lagged  Deflator. The nonfarm  deflator  provided  the best overall  fit in 
the equations  estimated  through  1969 and 1971, but also provided  the 
worst  fit  when  the sample  period  was  extended  to 1977. 
The deflator  might  be expected  to work in wage equations  for one of 
two  reasons:  either  because  it represents  past  wage  changes  that  affect  cur- 
rent  wages,  or  because  changes  in the  price  margins  or profitability  of firms 
affect  wages.  If it is only a proxy  for the former  effect,  then a wage-wage 
model  should  be used directly.  But occasional  observations  of rapid  wage 
gains  in suddenly  prosperous  industries-such as coal and oil after 1973 
-suggest  that profitability  may influence  wage setting. 
Generalized  effects of profitability  are difficult  to find in time-series 
data.  Although  early  work  on Phillips  curves  found an important  role for 
profits,  time-series  studies  that  include  the latest  decade  generally  do not. 
A secular  decline  in average  profitability  that coincides  with the accelera- 
tion of inflation  may be masking a causal relation between variations 
around  that secular  decline and wage changes.  Laurence  Seidman,  in his 
paper  in this  volume,  makes  such an adjustment  and  finds  that  profitabil- 
ity is an important  explanatory  variable  for wages. 
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equation  have  been  unsuccessful.  The effect  of wage  costs on prices  makes 
them  highly  collinear,  and one or the other  dominates  depending  on the 
sample  period.  Competition  among  tradable  goods  makes  the price  of im- 
ports  one  source  of influence  on deflator  prices  that  is independent  of wage 
costs. When the change in the import price of manufactured  goods is 
added to the wage-wage  equations  of table 5, that price is significant. 
However,  the equation  coefficients  are  somewhat  unstable  over the differ- 
ent sample  periods.  The equations  could  only be estimated  beginning  with 
1960 because  the import  price series is not available  before 1959. The 
equation estimated  for 1960-71,  the period before flexible exchange 
rates,  is: 
(2)  AQnE-  -1.05  +  7.40u*  +  0.41 AInE1 
(-2.4)  (4.6)  (1.8) 
+  0.42AIn E-2  +  0.11 AInMP-, 
(1.5)  (2.3) 
Durbin-Watson  =  2.6; standard  error =  0.28. 
where  all A In terms  are  multiplied  by 100 and  MP is the price  index for 
finished  manufactured  imports.  For the same  equation  estimated  through 
1977, the sum  of the coefficients  on the lagged  wage  term  is 0.88; and  the 
coefficient  on import  prices, 0.07. These equations  indicate  that beyond 
the effects  of unemployment  and a lagged  wage elasticity  of about  0.85, 
a 10 percent  change  in the price  of manufactured  import  goods alters  the 
price  of competing  tradable  goods by enough  to change  average  wages  by 
about 1 percent.  This estimate  seems high and should probably  not be 
taken at face value. It does provide some evidence that profit  margins 
have an independent  effect  on wages, although  it is hardly  conclusive  or 
successfully  quantified. 
Lagged Wages. The most robust simple specification  of the inertia 
process  seems to be the wage-wage  view modeled  in equations  5.1, 5.4, 
and  5.7. Their  errors  for the two latest  years  are relatively  small, and the 
two years  are tracked  rather  well without  a huge  change  in the error  such 
as that produced  by the deflator  equations.  The equations  fitted  through 
1969 or 1971, however,  greatly  underpredict  wage  changes  in subsequent 
years.  The equation  estimated  through  1977 reduces  these overestimates 
by raising  the sum of the lagged  wage coefficients  to about 1.0. 
A close look at the errors  in the 1972-75 period shows some direct 
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or 5.4 declined  by about 1 percentage  point in 1972-73. This may be 
interpreted  as the direct  effect  of controls.  The errors  then  jump  by over 
2 percentage  points in 1974-75. There  is no wage-wage  view of the in- 
flation  process  that predicts  this. The earlier  disaggregated  results  show 
that the acceleration  in 1974-75 was the same in both high-wage  and 
low-wage  industries,  so the possibility  can be ruled out that a distortion 
of relative  wages  in the control  period  led to this acceleration  in the aver- 
age. Even the assumption  that controls suppressed  a stubborn  rate of 
wage inflation  would only account  for a return  to 1 percent  underpre- 
dictions.  Something  between  this and no change  from  the 1972-73 resid- 
uals should  have  been expected  if the actual  wage experience  of 1972-73 
affected  the wage-wage  process  and,  therefore,  wage  changes  in 1974-75. 
The actual  behavior  of wages  indicates  they responded  to the actual  be- 
havior  of prices. 
When  the lagged  CPI and lagged  wages are used together  as explana- 
tory variables,  the coefficients  on unemployment  and on wage changes 
that  lag by one year are quite  uniform  for the three  sample  periods.  The 
estimated  coefficient  on the lagged CPI rises from near zero when the 
equation  is estimated  through  1969 to about 0.2 in equations  estimated 
through  1971 or 1977. Wage  changes  lagged  two years  only become  im- 
portant  when the estimation  period  is extended  to 1977, raising  the sum 
of all lagged inflation  coefficients  to 0.93. The equation fitted to the 
1954-71 period (all logs x  100) is: 
(3)  A ln E =  -0.69  +  7.34u*-1  +  0.52 A ln E-. 
(-0.7)  (3.3)  (2.1) 
+  0.07A1nEE2  +  0.21 Aln CP_i. 
(0.3)  (1.3) 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.8; standard  error =  0.66. 
The  prediction  errors  are: 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  Sum 
0.2  0.8  0.3  0.2  1.7  1.3  -0.4  0.9  5.0 
WAGE  BEHAVIOR:  CONCLUSIONS 
Once changes  in demographics  have been allowed  for (by measuring 
tightness  in the labor market  with the weighted  unemployment  rate used 
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the 1960s and 1970s is associated  with the effects  of lagged  inflation  on 
current  wage  changes.  The existence  of large  lagged  effects  created  inertia 
in inflation  that transmitted  past inflation  to current  wage changes  even 
when current  unemployment  rose. In addition,  the importance  of these 
lagged  effects  apparently  grew  as inflation  itself  became  more  entrenched. 
Today  inertia  is a more important  characteristic  of the inflation  process 
than  it was in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The disappointing  experience  with inflation  during  the 1970s can be 
understood  as a consequence  of this strong  and growing  inertia  together 
with some one-time developments  that added to inflation during this 
period.  These include,  in particular,  the catch-up  in union wages at the 
start  of the decade  and the international  explosion  of prices  for food and 
fuel  before  the  great  recession. 
The source  of this inertia  is not easily identified.  Wages  in high-wage 
industries  and those set under  collective  bargaining  are  relatively  insensi- 
tive to unemployment  and relatively  responsive  to the ongoing rate of 
inflation.  They  may  have  been  particularly  important  in the  failure  of aver- 
age wages  to decelerate  after 1969. However,  for aggregate  wages  to rise 
as fast as they have in the 1970s, the ongoing  inflation  rate must be an 
important  factor in wage determination  more generally,  possibly as a 
consequence  of patterning  other  wage changes  on those in the high-wage 
sectors  or occupations. 
No single explanatory  variable  adequately  describes  the effect  of past 
inflation  on current  wage changes.  In general,  wages responding  to past 
wages  offer  a better  description  of the process  than  wages  responding  sim- 
ply to the CPI. But to explain the developments  of the mid-1970s, one 
needs  to believe  there  was a substantial  direct  influence  of prices  on wages 
as well. This period  may  have  been unusual,  but some direct  effect  of past 
prices  on wages is also estimated  in equations  such as 3, which are fitted 
to long  periods  that  do not include  the mid-1970s.  In summary,  to explain 
current  wage  behavior,  the importance  of ongoing  inflation  is well estab- 
lished, but the particular  importance  of ongoing price (as opposed to 
wage) inflation  remains  unsettled. 
Although  it is difficult  to disprove  the hypothesis  that the inertia in 
aggregate  wages represents  expected inflation,  the estimates  favor the 
more  direct  hypothesis  that inertia  is a backward-looking  phenomenon. 
That  view  is supported  directly  by the analysis  of changes  in union  wages. 
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through  large  coefficients  on recent  inflation  rather  than through  modest 
coefficients  on inflation  rates  over  a long past  period:  expectations  models 
generally  assert  that  expectations  are  adjusted  gradually  and  therefore  de- 
pend  on a long  past  history  of actual  inflation.  A large  coefficient  on recent 
wage changes  is most naturally  interpreted  as a process  in which wages 
are  adjusted  to keep  up continuously  with  other  wages.  If these  results  are 
taken  to mean  that  expectations  are  simply  formed  by the most recent  ob- 
servation  of inflation,  the expectations  hypothesis  loses any distinctive 
significance,  for then  any  change  in actual  inflation  will have a full impact 
on inflation  in the next period,  just as the backward-looking  hypothesis 
would  predict.  Finally,  the failure  of any  lagged  values  of unemployment 
to enter  the wage equation  argues  against  expected  unemployment  rates 
as an  important  determinant  of wage  changes. 
Alternative  Views 
The mainline  model  that  I described  at the outset  of this paper  and  the 
empirical  evidence  just presented  provide  a fairly general  description  of 
the macroeconomy  and the inflation  process.  Although  they leave room 
for alternative  views about the microeconomic  underpinnings  of inertia 
and for further  research  on quantitative  questions,  they do provide a 
basis  for discussing  anti-inflation  policies. The blame  for inflation  or the 
remedies  for it, however,  are often argued  along lines that are not pre- 
dicted  by the mainline  model or from views of the economy  that are in- 
compatible  with  it. Before  examining  what  there  is to learn  from  the main- 
line model about strategies  for slowing  inflation,  I review  some of these 
dissenting  views. 
BUDGET  DEFICITS 
If a poll were  taken  to sample  opinions  on the causes  of inflation,  most 
votes would probably  go to government  deficits.  An economist would 
grant the effects of deficits on aggregate  demand and would be hard 
pressed  to find  causal  links  between  deficits  and inflation  over and above 
their effects on demand.  He would also be aware  that historically  most 
deficits have come from the operation  of automatic  stabilizers  during 
periods  of underemployment. 
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deficits  will  explain  inflation,  equations  4 and  5 were  estimated  in response 
to the opinion  polls, as follows: 
(4)  A ln GP=-0.0  +  1.04 LA  ln  GP-0.19  LRDG. 
(-0.3)  (5.5)  (-1.4) 
Period, 1954:1 to 1973:4; Durbin-Watson  =  1.7; standard  error =  0.004. 
(5)  AlnGP  =  0.00  +  l.llLAlnGP+  0.OOLRDG  +  0.003  DNIX. 
(0.1)  (6.5)  (0.04)  (1.9) 
Period, 1954:1 to 1977:2; Durbin-Watson  =  1.8; standard  error =  0.004. 
Four-quarter  percentage  changes  in the GNP deflator  (A ln GP) are ex- 
plained  with  Almon  lagged  values  of the deflator  itself (L A ln GP) and  of 
the ratio of the federal  deficit  to the GNP (LRDG). The lags extend 16 
quarters.  The equations  fitted  through  1977 include  the dummy  variable 
(DNIX) for the control  and postcontrol  period of the Nixon years that 
sums  to zero.  The qualitative  results  are  unaffected  by this  dummy  or by a 
dummy  for the wage-price  guideposts  of the 1960s. Equation  4, fitted 
through  the end of 1973, reveals  the negative  effect associated  with defi- 
cits, which is predicted  from the fact that variations  in the deficit  result 
primarily  from  variations  in the degree  of slack  in the economy.  When  the 
period  is extended  to 1977 in equation  5, the coincidence  of the price  ex- 
plosion of 1974-75 and the deep recession  and consequent  large  budget 
deficit  raise  the coefficient  estimated  for the deficit  to zero. 
The actual  relationship  between  budget  deficits  and economic  perfor- 
mance  is complicated,  and the equations  above are not intended  to sum- 
marize  that  relationship  in any  meaningful  way.  At a minimum,  variations 
in the deficit  would  have  to be decomposed  into those  that are  induced  by 
economic  activity  and those that represent  changes  in fiscal policy at a 
fixed  level of utilization.  Equations  4 and 5 are intended  simply  to dispel 
the view that the present  inflation  is caused  by deficits  or that cutting  the 
deficit  would  help eliminate  inflation  without  causing  recession. 
The lack of a causal  connection  between  budget  deficits  and inflation 
does not deny  possibly  important  linkages  between  government  programs 
and the current  inflation.  One important  message  in Robert Crandall's 
paper  in this volume is that government  programs  have contributed  to 
inflation  by pursuing  goals through  means  that  raise  the price  level rather 
than  through  means  that show up in the budget  deficit.  If the costs took 
the form of federal  expenditures  or tax credits  and thus appeared  in the 
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aggregate  demand  remained  the same. Paradoxically,  excessive anxiety 
about  deficits  can itself be inflationary. 
EXCESSIVE  GROWTH  OF  MONEY 
Besides  deficits,  a close contender  in public  opinion  polls on the causes 
of inflation  would be excessive  growth  of money. Unlike the deficit  ex- 
planation,  a positive connection  between  money growth  and inflation  is 
acknowledged  widely  by the professional  community.  What  divides  econ- 
omists is the issue of whether  or not a causal role can be assigned  to 
money  in addition  to its role as a determinant  of aggregate  demand.  The 
mainline  view acknowledges  the role of aggregate  demand  in inflation 
and  the role of money  in aggregate  demand.  It denies  any additional,  spe- 
cial role of money  in causing  inflation. 
Franco  Modigliani  and  Lucas  Papademos  have  reported  on attempts  to 
put money into mainline  inflation  equations.7  Like many other authors, 
they  found  a long mean  lag for the effect  of money  on prices  when  money 
was used alone in a reduced-form  equation.  This result  is entirely  in ac- 
cord  with  the  view  that  money  affects  aggregate  demand,  thereby  promptly 
influencing  real  activity  and  employment,  and  eventually  the inflation  rate. 
But  they  found  that  money  was  insignificant  when  added  to equations  that 
explain  prices  with  the unemployment  rate,  import  prices,  and  lagged  in- 
flation. 
Modigliani  and  Papademos  estimated  their  equations  through  1971. By 
extending  the data  period,  it is possible  to modify  these  results.  I explained 
the annual  change  in the GNP deflator  using the current  unemployment 
rate and three  years of lagged  values of the change  in money and of the 
dependent  variable.  When  the equation  was run from 1954 to 1971, the 
sum of the coefficients  on lagged money was only 0.13, with successive 
t statistics  of only 0.6, 0.1, and 0.2. When  the same equation  was rerun 
for the 1954-77 period,  the sum of the money coefficients  rose to 0.71 
with successive  t statistics  of 1.7, 1.2, and 0.6. Adding a dummy  for the 
control and postcontrol  period raised the sum of coefficients  to 0.77. 
Apparently  the recent  interest  in this  type  of explanation  of inflation  arises 
from the general  inability  of demand  variables  to explain  the inflation  of 
the mid-1970s  and  the coincidental  acceleration  of money  growth.  All the 
7.  Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos, "Targets for Monetary Policy in 
the Coming  Year,"  BPEA, 1:7975, pp. 141-63. 282  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
independent  explanatory  power of money comes from this one episode. 
To believe  that  money  has this independent  role in causing  inflation,  one 
has to believe  that the relatively  rapid  money  growth  of 1972-73 caused 
the subsequent  explosion  of prices  in 1974-75, creating  inflation  directly 
rather  than through  demand  variables  for perhaps  the first time in his- 
tory. This interpretation  not only strains  the imagination,  but is incon- 
sistent  with  the historical  evidence  of long lags in reduced-form  equations 
explaining  prices  with  money. 
SOCIAL  WELFARE  PROGRAMS 
Government  programs  of income maintenance  would also be high 
on a list of  popular explanations  of  inflation. Unemployment  com- 
pensation  and the minimum  wage are the two programs  that are most 
clearly related to wage behavior.  Both have been studied carefully  by 
economists and have at least potentially significant  effects on  labor 
markets. 
Table 7 shows the percentage  of after-tax  earnings  that was replaced 
by unemployment  benefits and the minimum  wage as a percentage  of 
average  earnings  during recent periods. Both measures  rose gradually 
during  the postwar  period  until  the last half of the 1960s. Between  1966- 
70 and the present,  the net replacement  ratio under  unemployment  com- 
pensation  increased  slightly,  while the relative  minimum  wage declined 
sharply. 
As was noted earlier,  Gramlich  estimated  that average  wages rise by 
about 0.03 percent  for each 1 percent  change  in the minimum.8  A sub- 
stantial  rise in the minimum,  such as the 15 percent  increase  of January 
1978, will have a noticeable  effect  on aggregate  wages.  However,  during 
the period  that inflation  was worsening,  the relative  minimum  wage was 
falling. And as the disaggregated  results showed, wages in low-wage 
industries  (where increases  in the minimum  wage have their principal 
effect) were falling behind other wages. The coverage  of the minimum 
wage was substantially  expanded  in the mid-1960s, adding  to its impact 
on average  wages  at that  time.  But that episode  is too remote  to have any 
relevance  to the inflation  of the 1970s. Finally,  by reducing  the employ- 
ment  prospects  of young workers,  the minimum  wage may add to their 
unemployment  and thus have a modest effect in shifting the Phillips 
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Table 7. Unemployment  Benefits  and  Minimum  Wage  Relative  to Average  Earnings, 
Selected  Periods,  1951-77 
Percent 




ratio(net)%  39.4  42.9  44.4  46.0  47.3  47.1 
Relative  minimum 
wageb  45.4  47.6  48.3  51.1  47.2  44.3 
Sources: Average weekly unemployment compensation benefits, Economic Report of  the  President, 
January 1978, table B-33, and updates from  U.S.  Department of Labor, Employment and  Training Ad- 
ministration; spendable earnings (worker with 3 dependents), U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business 
Statistics, 1975 (Government Printing Office, 1976) and Survey of Current  Business, various issues; straight- 
time earnings in manufacturing, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment  and Earnings, United  States, 
1909-75,  Bulletin 1312-10 (GPO,  1975), and Employment  and Earnings, various issues. 
a.  Unemployment compensation benefits as a percentage of spendable weekly earnings. 
b. Minimum wage as a percentage of straight-time  hourly earnings in manufacturing. 
curve.  Any such effect-and  I would expect  it to be quite  small-is  cap- 
tured  in using  the weighted  unemployment  rate  in the wage equation. 
Unemployment  compensation  has a potential  effect on wage inflation 
by reducing  the willingness  of recipients  to accept available  job offers. 
Together with other programs  of income maintenance,  it provides a 
disincentive  to work compared  with a situation  in which no support  is 
provided  or one in which support  does not depend on unemployment. 
However,  such programs  are not new to the recent  years of rapid  infla- 
tion. And as table 7 shows, the benefits  have not become much more 
generous  during  the period  when  inflation  has worsened.9 
In the majority  of cases, workers  receiving  unemployment  compensa- 
tion benefits  have been laid off from  jobs to which  they expect  to return. 
Wages in those jobs are inflexible  because of the formal and informal 
relations  binding employers  and employees, not because workers  who 
have been laid off are holding back their services waiting for better 
wages.  While  unemployment  compensation  may have some effect  on the 
response  of wages  to unemployment,  it is doubtful  that the effect  is large. 
9.  In a series of articles providing many constructive suggestions for reforming 
the unemployment  compensation system, Martin Feldstein has pointed out that re- 
placement ratios for certain workers can rise above the averages shown in table 7. 
See Martin Feldstein, "Unemployment  Compensation: Adverse Incentives and Dis- 
tributional Anomalies," National Tax Journal, vol.  27  (June 1974),  pp. 231-44. 
However, I doubt that such calculations could alter the verdict that there has been 
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The outcome  might  be different  if most of unemployment  among  those 
who receive  benefits  were well described  by simple  search  models and if 
wage offers  were varied  by firms  in response  to short-run  variations  in 
labor  market  tightness.  But  this  is not the case. 
MISPERCEPTION,  PERFECT  MARKETS, 
AND  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
The most serious  conceptual  challenge  to the mainline  model I have 
outlined  comes from a view that attributes  all of inflation  and unemploy- 
ment  to misperceptions  on the part  of workers  and  firms:  workers  are  led 
into more or less employment  than they would normally  want by their 
incorrect  reading  of wage  or price trends.  In a related  set of models,  "ra- 
tional"  expectations  and extreme  price and wage flexibility  are assumed 
to  characterize  the  macroeconomy.  Workers are assumed to  make 
market-clearing  wage and price changes  continuously,  based on the best 
information  available  and constrained  only by existing  contracts.  Except 
for information  lags and  delays  until existing  contracts  expire,  wages and 
prices are always adjusted  to provide equilibrium  levels of output and 
employment.  Both these models have an important  common  feature:  in 
contrast  to the mainline  model, they have variations  in inflation  causing 
variations  in unemployment  rather  than the reverse.  Without  inflation 
surprises,  unemployment  would always  be at a "natural  rate." 
The search  models  fail to explain  the widespread  phenomenon  of lay- 
offs or the cyclical  pattern  of quits.  To the extent  they predict  that wages 
must accelerate  if unemployment  is to be maintained  below its natural 
rate-their  central implication-they predict wages must decelerate  if 
unemployment  is to stay above  the natural  rate  for any sustained  period. 
Alternatively,  they  may assume  that  misperceptions  about  available  wage 
offers  take a long time to be corrected.  On the basis of this argument,  the 
persistence  of unemployment  and inflation  since the mid-1970s  is under- 
stood as a continued  overoptimism  about  available  wage offers.  Because 
most periods  of unemployment  have a duration  measured  in days or at 
most several  weeks,  it seems  unrealistic  to assume  years  of misperception 
to explain  unemployment. 
Models  that combine  wage and price flexibility  with assumptions  em- 
bodied in rational expectations  about behavior have similar problems 
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rate can persist  only until people become aware  of the situation  or re- 
negotiate  existing  contracts.  Except for three-year  wage agreements  ne- 
gotiated  with some large unions-agreements that cover only a small 
fraction  of the work  force-it  is difficult  to imagine  price  or wage  arrange- 
ments  in any  important  area  of the economy  that are  bound  by long-term 
contracts.  Thus, when unemployment  has deviated  from past levels for 
any  sustained  period,  the new unemployment  level must  be interpreted  as 
a new natural  rate. By contrast,  the mainstream  model that I have de- 
scribed recognizes sustained  periods of underemployment  and leaves 
open  the possibility  of changing  unemployment  through  demand  manage- 
ment. 
Slowing  Inflation:  Aggregate  Demand  and  Expectations 
The inflation  of the 1970s does not change  the conclusion  that slowing 
the economy  and raising  unemployment  can slow and eventually  elimi- 
nate inflation.  The evidence  is, however,  that inflation  would slow only 
gradually  in response  to holding  back aggregate  demand,  and that the 
cost in lost employment  and output per point of disinflation  would be 
large.  The equations  of table 5 generally  predict  inflation  will be less than 
one point  slower  in the third  year  of a policy  that  holds  the unemployment 
rate one point higher.  And the additional  unemployment  implies a loss 
of $50 billion  to $60 billion a year  in output  in today's  economy. 
A different  specification  might alter the numerical  estimates,  but it 
could  not reverse  the verdict  that  the anti-inflation  gains  from  restraining 
aggregate  demand  are disappointingly  small.  Arthur  Okun  recently  sum- 
marized  the estimates  from six different  econometric  models and came 
to a similarly  pessimistic  conclusion.'0  Whatever  view is held on the ur- 
gency  of slowing  inflation  today,  it is unrealistic  to believe  that  the public 
or its representatives  would  permit  the extended  period  of high  unemploy- 
ment  required  to slow  inflation  in this  manner. 
Stabilization  strategy  since 1975 may be interpreted  as an attempt  to 
find an output  path that would gradually  reduce unemployment  and at 
the same  time slow inflation.  The evidence  of the past few years  provides 
little hope for such a possibility.  After the hourly  earnings  index slowed 
in the early  quarters  of recovery,  it began  to accelerate  gradually  in 1977. 
10. Arthur M. Okun, "Efficient  Disinflationary Policies," American Economic 
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Equations  based  on the level of tightness  in the labor  market  predicted  a 
continuing  deceleration  given the slack labor markets  of 1976-77. But 
the predicted  unwinding  of inflation  in response  to unemployment  is so 
gradual  that it is easily offset by other inflationary  developments.  Food 
and import  prices rose faster  in 1977 than in 1976, although  the effect 
on wages of their speedup  in 1977 should have been slight.  Unemploy- 
ment declined  noticeably  during 1977, and this could help explain the 
wage speedup  if the change  in unemployment  as well as its level has an 
effect on wage inflation  that is not captured  in estimates  using annual 
data." But whatever  the explanation  is for recent wage changes, such 
developments  further  dramatize  the difficulty  of slowing  the present  infla- 
tion with demand  management  alone. 
Slowing  Inflation:  Expectations 
William  Fellner has articulated  the principal  challenge  to the pessi- 
mistic  verdict  on using  aggregate  demand  to slow inflation.'2  He views  the 
inertia of inflation  as a consequence  of generalized  expectations  of in- 
flation.  According  to Fellner, in recent  years contracts  governing  wages 
and prices  have been formulated  with the expectation  that inflation  will 
continue  into the future.'3  So long as these expectations  are maintained, 
they become a self-fulfilling  prophecy. To stop inflation,  policy must 
change  these  expectations.  In Fellner's  view, the only  way to change  them 
is through  a convincing  demonstration  that monetary  and fiscal  policies 
will not accommodate  the expected  inflation  rate. 
An example  will serve to illustrate  this point. Assume that 4 percent 
11. An effect from such changes appears in equations estimated with quarterly 
data. The insignificance  of lagged unemployment  when added to the wage equations 
reported  in table 5 argues against any important  effects from a change in unemploy- 
ment over a period as long as a year. I regard the correct specification  as an open 
question in light of the differing  results with quarterly  and annual data. 
12. William J. Fellner, Towards  a Reconstructiont  of Macroeconomics:  Problems 
of Theory  and Policy (American Enterprise  Institute, 1976). 
13. Martin Neil Baily, in "Stabilization  Policy and Private Economic Behavior," 
BPEA, 1:1978, pp. 11-50, has recently explored the idea that the generalized ex- 
pectation of prosperity has influenced the behavior of firms in a stabilizing way. 
Believing that the government will avoid the deep slumps of the past, firms them- 
selves respond  with hiring, stocking, and investment  decisions that are more stabiliz- 
ing than in the past. I interpret  Fellner's views on inflationary  expectations as anal- 
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real  growth  is the  desired  path  for output  and  that  6 percent  is the expected 
inflation  rate. A 10 percent  growth  rate of aggregate  demand  would be 
accommodating.  If aggregate-demand  growth were held to 8 percent, 
the econometric  evidence  predicts  that real growth  the first  year would 
slow by nearly  2 percent  while inflation  would slow only slightly.  After 
two years,  real output  would  be more  than 3 percent  below the 4 percent 
growth  path,  and  prices  would  be about  1 percent  below  that  path.  Fellner 
reasons  that,  by making  the decision  to slow aggregate  demand  convincing, 
expectations  would change and the division between real growth and 
inflation  would improve.  The coefficients  of the model that yield pessi- 
mistic projections  today would be changed  by the clear determination 
of the authorities  to adopt a nonaccommodating  policy. 
How plausible  is this  remedy  for inflation?  The 1973-75 recession  ap- 
parently  did not change  the coefficients.  It could  be argued,  however,  that 
this  period  did  not demonstrate  nonaccommodation  convincingly  because 
policies  promptly  turned  to aiding  recovery  once  unemployment  increased. 
Let me bring  together  the scattered  evidence  presented  earlier  for ques- 
tioning  Fellner's  optimism. 
First, the evidence  is that the inertia  process is expectational  but to 
only a limited extent. That does not mean that people do not have ex- 
pectations  about inflation,  but simply that current  wage and price de- 
cisions, as opposed to decisions  in other spheres  such as lending or in- 
vesting, are not governed  by those expectations.  Even in the area of 
long-term  labor contracts,  in which  expectations  could be important,  the 
analysis  presented  above shows that wage developments  are better ex- 
plained  as backward  looking and that escalators  are used to avoid pre- 
dicting  the future.  For most questions  regarding  inflation  it is not crucial 
to know  whether  the inertia  process  is forward  looking  or backward  look- 
ing.  It does matter  here. 
Second, even if the econometric  coefficients  from Phillips curves are 
interpreted  as expectational  rather  than backward  looking, how much 
will an announced  policy of demand  restraint  affect  those expectations? 
If a nonaccommodating  aggregate-demand  policy is totally  convincing,  it 
will lead people to expect that unemployment  will rise. But why should 
this affect  their expectations  about inflation  by more than the short-run 
Phillips  curve  predicts?  If inflation  responds  weakly  to actual  unemploy- 
ment,  why should  expected  inflation  respond  so strongly  to expected  un- 
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This  leaves  room  for a small  gain  in Fellner's  scheme.  If there  are  some 
wage  contracts  made  with  a view to the unemployment  rate  anticipated  in 
the future,  expecting  more unemployment  should  modify such contracts 
by the amount  predicted  by the  Phillips  curve.  If a restrictive  nominal  GNP 
path is to be pursued,  there  is thus some gain from announcing  it ahead 
of time.  My only question  is whether  there  is reason  to expect  more than 
the improvement  predicted  by the Phillips curve as applied to the ex- 
pected  future  course  of unemployment.  And if even  that effect  is confined 
to a small  subset  of contracts  that are actually  forward  looking,  the total 
benefits  would  be limited.  On the price  side,  there  are  depletable  resources 
whose price depends  on expectations  of prospective  demand,  but these 
are  not important  in the  overall  price  level. 
If wage  and  price  setting  were  sufficiently  concentrated  in this  economy, 
the possibilities  for affecting  inflation  through  Fellner's  route would be 
greatly  enhanced.  A roomful  of private  decisionmakers  who recognized 
that their  inflationary  behavior  would directly  affect  their  level of output 
and employment  would be expected  to respond  favorably  to a govern- 
ment policy of nonaccommodation.  That is not what occurs  in the U.S. 
economy. 
Linking  an incomes  policy to an announced  nonaccommodating  policy 
on aggregate  demand  would help achieve  Fellner's  result.  As discussed 
below, an effective  incomes  policy would produce  a more  favorable  pro- 
spective split between real growth and inflation  for any given path of 
nominal  demand  growth.  Thus,  expectations  of inflation  would  change  by 
more  than  the Phillips  curve  predicts.  And to the extent  that  expectations 
do affect  current  wage decisions-which is still an open question-they 
would complement  an incomes  policy. Although  it is an incomes  policy 
that changes the immediate  trade-off,  the nonaccommodating  demand 
policy is a necessary  complement.  Without  it, the reduced  inflation  prom- 
ised by the improved  trade-off  could be dissipated  by a movement  along 
the  new  trade-off  curve. 
Slowing  Inflation:  Tax-Based  Incomes  Policies 
Although there are several variations  of tax-based  incomes policies 
(TIPs), their  differences  are  primarily  important  in determining  their  ac- 
ceptability,  the ease of their implementation,  and their effectiveness  in 
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in other papers  in this volume. At the macroeconomic  level, the main 
impact  of alternative  TIPs affecting  wages  will be similar.  And TIPs that 
act on prices  primarily  ensure  that  price  restraint  parallels  wage  restraint, 
which  is what the macroeconomic  model predicts  without  such policies. 
It is simplest  to integrate  TIP effects  into the macroeconomic  model  by 
assuming  that the same path of real output  is pursued  with and without 
the program.  Starting  from the present  state of the economy,  a TIP that 
causes individual  wages to rise more slowly than they otherwise  would 
can be represented  simply  as a reduction  in the constant  term  of the wage 
equation.  Whether  TIP will alter  the slope of the short-run  Phillips  curve 
or whether  it will reduce  permanently  the unemployment  rate that repre- 
sents full employment  are separate issues that are briefly considered 
below.  With  a downward  shift  in the constant  term  of the wage equation, 
nominal  aggregate  demand  must be reduced  by an amount  that is pro- 
portional  to the shift in order  to maintain  the desired  output  path. This 
necessitates  an appropriate  combined  adjustment  in fiscal and monetary 
policies.  This relatively  simple  procedure  is all that  is needed  to integrate 
TIP and aggregate  demand  policies  in the first  year;  a similar  adjustment 
is required  in subsequent  years  if the shift caused  by TIP each year could 
be specified.  But the macroeconomic  analysis  does raise some questions 
about  the size of that  shift  in subsequent  years  and  the difficulty  of attain- 
ing  it. 
LAGGED  EFFECTS 
In most views of the inflation  process, the slower average  wage in- 
creases  resulting  from TIP in the first  year will reduce  wage pressures  in 
the second  year.  If prices  slow correspondingly,  as would  be expected,  this 
favorable  lagged  effect  would  be predicted  by any of the aggregate  equa- 
tions  discussed  earlier.  Because  the estimated  lags are  short,  a major  frac- 
tion of the first  year's  improvement  in inflation  will be perpetuated  into 
the second  year.  In actual  experience,  however,  some of the complications 
introduced  by TIPs might lead to lagged effects that are different  from 
these  estimates. 
Any TIP program  may alter slightly the distribution  of wages. The 
possibilities  are numerous  and the likely outcomes differ according  to 
whether  a penalty  or reward  TIP is employed.  The main possibility  for 
obtaining  lagged  effects  that are noticeably  smaller  than  the macromodel 290  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1978 
predicts  probably  arises  in the case of a reward  TIP that  is employed  for 
only one year. On the one hand, without a reward  in the second year, 
workers  whose wages had been restrained  would tend to increase  their 
wage demands  to catch up with those that had not. On the other hand, 
firms  that  had not participated  would be at a competitive  cost disadvan- 
tage  relative  to firms  that  had, and  that  would  put downward  pressure  on 
their  wage offers. If these two influences  cancel each other, the lagged 
effects  from  the economic  equations  should  hold. 
If the lagged  wage effects  in the macroeconomic  model represent  gen- 
eralized  expectations,  the TIP program  can be viewed  in two ways. First, 
expectations  that are based on actual  experience  should  be favorably  in- 
fluenced by the initial slowdown in average wages and prices under 
TIP. This influence  can be expected  to grow if TIP effects are present 
over successive  years. Second, expectations  should be influenced  by the 
existence  of TIP as a specific and acceptable  anti-inflation  program.  It 
should enhance the effects on  inflationary  expectations that Fellner 
looks for through  policies of nonaccommodating  aggregate  demand. I 
have argued  that these  policies  may be weak  because  their  primary  effect 
would be to change  expectations  of unemployment.  Together  with TIP, 
a greater  part of any change  in nominal  demand  expectations  would be 
changes  in expectations  of the price  level. 
CHANGING  THE  STRUCTURE 
TIPs are sometimes  espoused  as a means  of shifting  the Phillips  curve 
in a favorable  direction.  This is one interpretation  of shifting  the constant 
term in the aggregate-wage  equation.  There is little basis, however,  for 
judging  whether  such  a favorable  shift  would  be maintained  in a period  of 
substantially  tighter  labor markets.  Because excess demand  in the labor 
market  now appears  to develop gradually,  TIP might make the Phillips 
curve  more nearly  L-shaped.  In moderately  tight markets,  wages might 
be restrained,  producing  an improved  trade-off;  but in extremely  tight 
labor markets,  TIP might be relatively  ineffective  and the short-term 
trade-off  might  be the same  as  before. 
TIPs do not have to reduce  the unemployment  rate  that  represents  full 
employment  in order  to be useful.  They would be a valuable  tool if they 
were simply a shortcut  to price stability  and slowed the present  wage- 
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were  also an indirect  remedy  for structural  problems  in the labor  market 
that produce  inflation  while involuntary  unemployment  still exists, that 
would  be a bonus. 
Measures  to Cut  Costs  and  Prices 
What  effect  can we expect  on the ongoing  inflation  rate  from  one-time 
increases  or reductions  in prices  or costs?  We can rely on cost changes  to 
be reflected  in prices. Beyond  that, the empirical  evidence  is unfailingly 
ambiguous.  The price shocks of the mid-1970s affected  wages, but not 
proportionately.  Consumer  prices  appear  to have  some  persistent  effect  on 
wages,  but  it is modest  once the effects  of lagged  wages  themselves  are al- 
lowed  for. On the basis  of the evidence,  it appears  that  only a minor  frac- 
tion  of any  shock  to prices  would  filter  through  into average  wage  changes 
and thus have some multiplied  effect. That still makes measures  to cut 
prices  and  costs worth  pursuing  and  their  opposites  worth  avoiding.  Even 
if only one-quarter  of any price change  influences  wages, 1 percent  re- 
moved  from the CPI reduces  wage inflation  by about as much as 1 per- 
centage  point  more  unemployment  for one  year. 
Measures  to cut prices  and costs can be effectively  included  as part  of 
a larger  anti-inflation  strategy.  In any such strategy,  success  will be self- 
perpetuating.  Failure  in the aggregate  will almost  surely  cause the pieces 
to come apart.  If the government  can point to direct  price-cutting  mea- 
sures  of its own, it would  stand  a better  chance  of obtaining  support  from 
the private  sector, either  for voluntary  restraint  or for TIP. And if the 
government  could  accomplish  that,  it could  change  the inertia  equations  in 
a favorable  way. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Martin  Neil Baily: George  Perry  presents  and discusses  in an interesting 
and  provocative  way several  hypotheses  relevant  to anti-inflationary  pol- 
icy. Perry  describes  convincingly  the tremendous  inertia  in wage  behavior 
during  inflation  and also brings  out some new and informative  aspects  of 
the Phillips  curve.  I have a few doubts  to raise,  however,  about  his con- 
clusions. 
First, Perry shows the relatively  greater  inflexibility  of wages in the 
high-wage  and union  sectors.  The low-wage  and  nonunion  sectors  appear 
to be more responsive  to short-run  economic conditions.  This result is 
plausible  and can be rationalized,  for example,  on the grounds  that  wage 
contracts  are more important  in the high-wage  and union sectors. The 
disaggregated  wage equations  that Perry  estimates,  however,  contain  no 
variables  that  will hold the wage distribution  together.  In BPEA, 2:1977, 
James  Tobin and I developed  some results  suggesting  the importance  of 
the relative  sectoral  wage level as a determinant  of the rate of change 
of a sector's  wage. Perry  does not have to accept our formulation,  but 
one would expect some variable  to be included that prevents  relative 
wages  from  diverging  indefinitely.  In the past  few years  union  wages  have 
increased  relative  to nonunion  wages.  This fact is interesting  in itself and 
relevant  for wage  policy.  But if union  wages continue  to grow  faster  than 
nonunion  wages,  there  will surely  be increasing  stress  in the wage struc- 
ture  that  will eventually  affect  the rates  of change  of wages  in both sectors. 
Second,  Perry  argues  that the true wage equation  is characterized  by 
a "catch-up"  augmented  Phillips  curve, rather  than by an expectations- 
augmented  Phillips  curve.  The arguments  for this view seemed  to me un- 
convincing.  To demonstrate  this  would  require  an analysis  of how expec- 
tations  are  formed  and  how the catch-up  is computed,  realizing  that  these 
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two are different  in principle  and that they have in fact behaved  differ- 
ently enough  over some historical  period that the data can test the two 
alternatives.  To be more specific,  given all the shocks that have hit the 
economy  recently  and the tremendous  inertia  evident  in wage behavior, 
it may have been true that the best estimate  of one year's  wage increase 
was the previous  year's  wage  increase.  If even half-true,  this would  make 
the  two  hypotheses  difficult  to distinguish. 
Third,  I was  puzzled  by two aspects  of Perry's  procedure  and  so I reran 
his aggregate  equation.  I was surprised  that his wage-wage  equation  did 
not allow for serial correlation  of the errors,  but I discovered  that this 
was because  the correction  made only a minor  difference.  Perry  himself 
notes that the price feedbacks  do seem to decline in importance  with a 
serial  correlation  correction.  However,  I came to a different  conclusion 
than Perry did regarding  the stability  of the equation.  His predictions 
are made using actual values of the feedback  variables  rather  than the 
predicted  values from previous  periods.  This is a great  help in keeping 
the equation  on track  tlhrough  the 1970s. My version  of Perry's  equation 
5.4 (the unemployment  rate  for adult  males  used in place of the weighted 
aggregate  rate) underpredicted  the rate of wage inflation  in every year 
from 1971 through  1977 and gave a cumulative  underprediction  of over 
16percentby  1977. 
In fairness  to Perry,  I should  point out that  he does say that the wage- 
wage spiral alone cannot explain the behavior  of the 1970s. This is a 
crucial  point for both theory and policy, however, and requires  more 
emphasis.  It is difficult  to avoid the conclusion  that the rapid  price  infla- 
tion and slow growth  of real wages  in the 1970s caused  an upward  pres- 
sure  on wage  settlements,  particularly  in the union  and  high-wage  sectors, 
as Perry's  earlier  results  suggested.  The only other alternative  is to argue 
that Perry has sharply underestimated the true nonaccelerating-inflation 
rate  of unemployment  (NAIRU) or natural  rate.  Wage acceleration  has 
occurred,  in this alternative  view, because  the actual  unlemployment  rate 
for 1971-77, which averaged  6.5 percent,  was below the NAIRU. 
As a final  check  on the stability  of the Phillips  curve,  I ran an F-test  to 
see if the coefficients  of the wage-wage  or wage-price  equations had 
shifted  significantly.  The null hypothesis  was that the coefficients  had re- 
mained  constant  across  the 1956-69 and 1970-77 periods.  These dates 
were  selected  because  the lack of responsiveness  of wages  to the 1970-71 
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behavior.  The null hypothesis  was rejected  at the 5 percent  level for my 
calculations  of Perry's  wage-wage  and wage-price  equations. 
In short,  therefore,  I am less confident  than Perry  that we really do 
have a stable structural  relation  in current  Phillips curve specifications. 
However,  there are two lessons that Perry  wants us to learn from the 
1960s and 1970s. If the economy is wound up too much, wages and 
prices  begin  to accelerate.  If unemployment  is raised  to slow things  down 
again,  it is a painful  process.  I have  no quarrel  with  either  of these  lessons. 
The regressions  on inflation  against  the deficit  and on inflation  against 
money  growth  are  fun. I hope the myth  about  the deficit  is diminished  by 
these findings.  The improved  performance  of money growth as an ex- 
planation  of the 1972-77 inflation  does not give greater  support  to the 
monetarist  than  to the structuralist  view  of inflation.  The Federal  Reserve 
Board is not immune  from political forces, nor should it be. It cannot 
tolerate  prolonged,  excessive unemployment.  If structural  factors push 
out the inflation/unemployment  trade-off-resulting  in inflationary  price 
pressure  even at high unemployment-the Federal Reserve Board is 
forced to accommodate  at least some of this pressure.  Consequently, 
high  inflation  and high money  growth  will tend to go together,  even with 
a structuralist  perspective. 
Perry  presents  a brief  discussion  of the misperception  theories.  I think 
these theories  can accommodate  layoffs  better  than Perry  indicates,  but 
I share  his general  skepticism  that expectational  errors  can plausibly  ex- 
plain the persistence  of unemployment  movements.  And this also leads 
me to agree  with his mistrust  of the use of policy announcements  to re- 
duce  inflationary  pressure  directly. 
In conclusion,  I commend  Perry for his interesting  and stimulating 
paper.  If it did not convince me on all points, this merely reflects  the 
difficulty  of the  issues  being  tackled. 
William  Poole: The basic message  of George Perry's  paper is that the 
Phillips  curve  is alive and well and that the evidence  continues  to sup- 
port  the proposition  that  higher  unemployment  buys a distressingly  small 
rate of deceleration  in inflation.  I do not have any major  quarrels  with 
Perry  on the  matters  analyzed  in his paper. 
For the purposes  at hand it is not necessary  to say much about the 
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be called the original  Phillips curve tradition,  as distinguished  from the 
more recent  view of the curve developed  by Milton Friedman,  Edmund 
Phelps, and Robert Lucas. Under the traditional  view, wage and price 
behavior-supported by contractual,  collective bargaining,  and other 
institutional  considerations-reflects a  substantial degree of  inertia, 
whereas  according  to the view held by Friedman,  Phelps, and Lucas, 
inertia  is not inherent  in behavior  but reflects  correctly  perceived  inertia 
in inflation  caused  by the monetary  policies of the government.  The im- 
portance  of distinguishing  between  these two views is that according  to 
the  traditional  view,  demand  management  can  reduce  inflation  only  slowly 
and painfully,  while under the alternative  view, expectations  could in 
principle  be altered  relatively  quickly  and, therefore,  at little unemploy- 
ment  cost. 
Perry  attempts  to provide  evidence  on this issue  by examining  what  he 
calls  forward-looking  and  backward-looking  Phillips  curve  specifications. 
I find  his evidence  supporting  the backward-looking  specifications  uncon- 
vincing.  Consider,  for example,  the implications  of the forward-looking 
theory for the apparently  backward-looking  wage-wage specification. 
Suppose  wages  are set on the basis  of a price  forecast  for the next several 
years.  Clearly,  in trying  to explain  the wage  behavior  of the current  year, 
last year's  wages could be a more accurate  measure  of current  expecta- 
tions of future  inflation  than any proxy constructed  from past or future 
price  changes.  I believe  that  it is simply  not possible  to obtain  convincing 
evidence  on this issue  from  the approach  Perry  follows. 
From other evidence  there can be no question  that forward-looking 
behavior  is important.  The increasing  use of cost-of-living  clauses  reflects 
a structural  modification  to contracts  in anticipation  of continuing  infla- 
tion. In nonunion  situations  many companies  have apparently  replaced 
annual salary reviews with semiannual  reviews so that wages can be 
linked  more  closely  to changes  in price  level. And evidence  from  episodes 
of hyperinflation  in other  countries  makes  it clear  that institutional  prac- 
tices seemingly  anchored  in bedrock  are adjusted  amazingly  rapidly  when 
inflation  reaches  triple-digit  and higher  rates. 
If Perry  underestimates  the importance  of forward-looking  behavior, 
as I think  he does, the near-term  policy significance  of this issue is never- 
theless  limited.  Even the most ardent  believer  in the importance  of expec- 
tations  has a difficult  time finding  policy proposals  that promise  to gen- 296  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1978 
erate  a quick  and  lasting  change  in inflationary  expectations.  Suppose,  for 
example,  that  the Federal  Reserve  announced  that money  growth  would 
be reduced  to a 4 percent  annual  rate immediately  and then held at that 
rate indefinitely.  It would be unlikely that this announcement  would 
change  inflationary  expectations.  The Federal Reserve has not always 
achieved  its announced  money  growth  targets;  moreover,  there  is a possi- 
bility that the President,  the Congress,  or both would force a change  in 
Federal  Reserve  policy if a recession  occurred.  From this viewpoint,  the 
problem  is not an economic  policy problem  at all, but rather  one of con- 
structing  a political  consensus  for a noninflationary  monetary  policy. 
It is unlikely  that long-run  inflationary  expectations  can be reduced 
without  an actual  decline  in inflation  and clear  evidence  of a commitment 
to less inflationary  policies. For the evidence  to be clear, it may well be 
necessary  for the government  consciously  and deliberately  to avoid fol- 
lowing  expansionary  policies  in the  next  recession. 
If Perry's  estimates  are  taken  at face value,  a monetary  policy  that  kept 
the unemployment  rate 1 percentage  point above the natural  rate would 
be consistent  with a decline in the inflation  rate by 0.3 percentage  point 
each  year.  That  policy  would  then  call for a deceleration  of money  growth 
sufficient  to slow nominal  GNP growth  by 0.3 percentage  point a year. 
With  this policy it would take at least twenty  years of unemployment  at 
1 percentage  point above the natural  rate to reduce  the inflation  rate to 
zero. (Indeed, with Perry's  two-year  lag structure,  it would take nearly 
thirty  years.) It is difficult  for me to believe  that  prediction  of the results 
of such a monetary  policy;  surely  in time the policy  would change  expec- 
tations and lead to adaptations  consistent  with full employment  on the 
average.  Nevertheless,  Perry's  estimates  may well be reasonable  for the 
time required  for changed  policies to become credible  and to affect  ex- 
pectations.  This  period  could  easily  be three  to five  years. 
A number  of policy proposals,  including  tax-based  incomes  policies, 
should be viewed  in the light of their prospects  for reducing  the unem- 
ployment  costs  of the  more  basic  anti-inflationary  policy  of slowing  money 
growth.  Perry  mentions,  but insufficiently  emphasizes,  the importance  of 
reducing  nominal  income growth.  Without  monetary  deceleration,  other 
policies  to reduce  inflation  are absolutely  guaranteed  to fail; with mone- 
tary  deceleration,  these other  policies may reduce  the employment  costs 
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Perry  does not discuss  this  possibility  in detail,  but I think  that  the im- 
portance  of nonmonetary  policies  for the  inflation  issue  is primarily  politi- 
cal and expectational.  The economics  of these policies should  be judged 
on efficiency  and public  finance  considerations. 
General  Discussion 
William  Fellner amplified  his views on anti-inflationary  policy. He 
agreed  with Perry  that reasonably  optimistic  views about  the output  and 
employment  consequences  of his demand  policy implied  changes  in spe- 
cific  regression  coefficients  in response  to a consistent  and credible  policy 
line. He suggested  that the coefficient  that  would change  could be identi- 
fied,  for example,  in a model  of the type  developed  in Phillip  Cagan's  cur- 
rent work.  For a slack of given size, this is the coefficient  by which it is 
necessary,to  multiply  the difference  between  the expected  long-run  infla- 
tion rate and  the currently  observed  rate  to obtain  the current  downward 
revision  of the expected  long-run  rate.  This revision  causes  current  price 
deceleration,  which  either  is added  to the deceleration  resulting  from any 
increase  in the slack or is deducted  from  the price acceleration  resulting 
from any decrease.  Fellner suggested  that, under a credible policy of 
gradually  reducing  the rate of increase  of money GNP until inflation  is 
eliminated,  the numerical  value of the coefficient  determining  the adjust- 
ment of price-trend  expectations  would increase significantly.  This, he 
argued,  is because the erratic  policies of the past must have made the 
public  hesitant  to lower  its long-run  inflation  expectations  during  the brief 
periods  of nondiminishing  slack. Fellner also said that the alternative  to 
the course  he is advocating  would  be an uncomfortably  controlled  system, 
rather  than the kind of economy  envisaged  by the advocates  of incomes 
policy. 
Michael  Wachter  agreed  with  Fellner  on the importance  of the chang- 
ing responsiveness  of inflation  to government  policy actions and pro- 
nouncements.  Wachter  said that the government  had actually  reduced 
the effectiveness  of its anti-inflation  policy and increased  confusion  dur- 
ing the most recent  recession  by frequently  stating  that policy was much 
less contractionary  than  it actually  was. 
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money  stock should  grow  less rapidly  than if such a scheme  were not in 
effect.  He cautioned  against  accompanying  a TIP scheme  with aggregate 
demand  policies  that are contractionary  in real terms. 
Robert  Gordon  said that it was clear from the evidence  of the 1960s 
and  early  1970s that  wages  do not adjust  fully  to accelerations  in the con- 
sumer  price  index;  but he considered  current  knowledge  about  the effects 
of other wage determinants  uncertain.  In particular,  he stated that it 
would  be difficult  to distinguish  between  the influence  of product  prices 
and  the influence  of other  wages  because  of the high collinearity  in these 
variables.  Franco  Modigliani  reported  that the coefficient  on wages had 
been inappropriately  negative  in wage regressions  with both past wages 
and  past prices  as independent  variables.  Perry  responded  that this result 
came  from  using  hourly  compensation  as a wage variable;  such compen- 
sation  is currently  poorly  measured  and  is influenced  by many  nonmarket 
events  such as payroll  tax changes.  Edward  Gramlich  argued  that wages 
tend to be considerably  more inflexible  than  prices  in the U.S. economy. 
Thus,  the use of longer  lags  might  lend  support  to a price-wage  hypothesis. 
Wachter  voiced the opinion that the lagged money supply would per- 
form as well as lagged  prices  or wages in explaining  wage inflation.  But 
Modigliani  agreed  with Perry that money supply or fiscal policy have 
no effect  above  that already  captured  by the excess demand  variable. 
Other participants  at the conference  discussed  whether  expected or 
past  prices  were  more  important  in determining  wages.  Frederic  Mishkin 
suggested  that the presence  in wage equations  of only short  lags on price 
inflation did not provide evidence supporting  backward-  rather than 
forward-looking  wage behavior.  If the inflation  rate followed a random 
walk,  for example,  the most recent  inflation  rate would be the best pre- 
dictor of future inflation  rates. Therefore,  even if wage behavior  was 
forward  looking,  the most  recent  inflation  rate  would  contain  all the rele- 
vant information  about expected inflation.  Mishkin emphasized,  how- 
ever,  that  the relationship  between  past and expected  price  inflation  need 
not be a stable  one and  might  depend  on the exact  nature  of the inflation- 
ary  process.  Thomas  Juster  said that short-run  inflationary  expectations 
were more volatile than long-run  expectations  and that long-run  rather 
than short-run  expectations  were relevant  for wage determination.  This 
suggested  the need to use longer  lags. 
Gardner  Ackley and James  Duesenberry  questioned  the usefulness  of 
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were good microeconomic  reasons  for product  prices, consumer  prices, 
and  other  wages  to enter  the process  in both  a retrospective  and  a prospec- 
tive form. Greater  disaggregation  would be required  to distinguish  their 
relative  importance.  This uncertainty  suggested  that policies should not 
be adopted  that depend too heavily on any single explanation.  Ackley 
reasoned  that  each of these variables  might  be important  to different  sec- 
tors at various times. As inflation  increased,  institutional  innovations, 
such as cost-of-living  allowances,  might  well lead to changes  in the rela- 
tive  importance  of different  variables. 
The discussion  turned  to the behavior  of relative  wages.  John Shoven 
suggested  that  the larger  recent  increases  in wages  in the high-wage  indus- 
tries  might  be explained  either  by the greater  use of cost-of-living  allow- 
ances in the high-wage  unionized  sector, or by the fact that as skilled 
wages moved into higher  marginal  tax brackets  a larger  before-tax  dis- 
persion  was required  to maintain  the same after-tax  differentials.  Duesen- 
berry  mentioned  Perry's  evidence  that  wages  in the high-wage  sector  were 
more  sensitive  to inflation  and  less sensitive  to unemployment  than those 
in the low-wage  sectors.  If the Phillips  curve  in the high-wage  sector  were 
flatter  than  that  in the low-wage  sector,  it was likely  they  would  intersect; 
if they did not, it would not lead to the cumulative  divergence  in wages 
that  concerned  Martin  Baily  in his discussion. 
Modigliani  and Robert Hall said that Perry had treated  the rational 
expectations  school too casually.  Hall stated  that Perry  should  have dis- 
cussed  the new view of this school-that  recent changes  in the inflation 
rate have been caused  by changes  in the natural  rate because of supply 
shifts.  Despite  this omission,  he agreed  with  Perry's  Keynesian  conclusion 
that changes  in aggregate  demand  influence  output  far more than  prices. 
Perry  replied  that  he had not tried  to present  a comprehensive  discussion 
of the rational  expectations  view but simply discussed  where it differed 
from the mainline  model. The principal  difference  is that the mainline 
model recognizes  the possibility  of extended  periods of cyclical unem- 
ployment,  while the rational  expectations  model treats  such occurrences 
as changes  in the  natural  rate. 